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Abstract 
This paper develops a simple theory of pay structures and pay levels across heterogeneous 
agents  by  bringing  together  optimal  contracts  inside  the  firm  and  competitive  resource 
allocation in the market. The central idea is that more talented people tend to create greater 
value but face larger conflicts of interest in their employment relationship, and different pay 
contracts are optimally designed to mitigate different levels of agency problems. Sorted by 
their talent, people are stratified into production workers, self-employed, salaried managers 
with low-powered performance pay, and CEOs with high-powered equity-based pay. In a 
general equilibrium framework, I show that the sorting of managerial talent into pay contracts 
is tied to firm size. The theory highlights that high-powered incentive pay and large scales of 
operations  cause the disproportionately large wage  earnings  at  the top,  and are the main 
source of income inequality. Market forces that reallocate resources from smaller to larger 
firms tend to increase the threshold talent for becoming a manager, increase the prevalence of 
high-powered incentive pay, raise the top earnings, and spread out the wage distribution. 
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 Y. Wu, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
Why is it so unusual for a construction worker or a low-ranked manager to receive a stock
option tied to the pro￿ts of the company they work for? Why are people running a small
grocery store usually self-employed? Why is a CEO in large companies seldom paid by a ￿ at
salary? It seems that there exists some rule that assigns people to di⁄erent pay structures.
The role of pay structures has caught more and more attention in the debate about the
recent trends in wage distribution. A number of studies have attributed the surging top
income to the prevalence of the equity-based pay scheme among CEOs and other senior
managers in large companies (Hall and Liebman 1998; Murphy 1999; Piketty and Saez 2003,
2006; Autor et al 2006; Kaplan and Rauh 2010). Based on a broad cross-section of the
workforce in the US, Lemieux et al (2009) show that performance pay accounts for a signi￿cant
fraction of the growth in the variance of male wages, and for most of the increase in wage
inequality at the top percentiles. A better understanding of the relationship between pay
structures and pay levels is called for to address the issue of wage distribution.
The purpose of the current paper is to discover the rule that determines the coincidence
between pay structures and pay levels, trace its causes, and explore its economic consequences.
Traditional labor economics that equates workers￿wages to their marginal products cannot
explain workers￿pay structures. On the other hand, agency theory answers the question "how
to pay" inside the ￿rm by referring to information asymmetries and moral hazard, but says
little about "how much to pay", and is silent on the distribution of pay level in the aggregate
economy. My approach, therefore, is to bring together agency problems inside the ￿rm and
competitive resource allocation in the market.
Starting with an exogenous distribution of managerial talent in the population, I endog-
enize the distribution of ￿rm size, the level of agency problems inside the ￿rms, the optimal
pay structures and managerial incentives, and ultimately the distribution of wage earnings in
a structural general equilibrium model. The central idea is that more talented people tend to
create greater value, which leads to larger interest con￿ icts in a principal-agent relationship.
Confronted with contractual frictions, ￿rms have to design di⁄erent pay contracts to mitigate
di⁄erent levels of agency problems. Sorted by their talent, people are strati￿ed into produc-
tion workers, self-employed, salaried managers with low-powered performance pay, and CEOs
with high-powered equity-based pay tied to the market value of ￿rms. Although there exists
a monotonic relationship between talent and pay level, the power of pay structure is not
monotonic in people￿ s talent.
This non-monotonicity delivers a number of interesting results. The tendency to reinforce
and exaggerate the di⁄erence in generic talent varies across pay structures and across ￿rms
with di⁄erent size. A large fraction of people works as production workers and has no chance
to activate their managerial talent; the pay to the self-employed is high-powered, but is
constrained by the size of their ￿rms; mediocre managers employed by medium-size ￿rms
receive the same level of expected salary, although they di⁄er in their talent; only very
2talented people employed by large ￿rms have the opportunities to amplify their talent through
notable market value. Under reasonable assumptions on the talent distribution and parameter
values of market conditions, the model generates patterns in pay structure and wage earnings
that match well-established empirical ￿ndings: the high-powered equity-based pay scheme
is essentially a top manager and large ￿rm phenomenon; the wage distribution is skewed to
the right with particularly high inequality at the top. Moreover, the theory identi￿es the
structure of the product markets as an important factor to explain the large variations in
the wage distribution across sectors, between countries and over time. Market forces that
reallocate resources from smaller to larger ￿rms tend to select more talented managers into
the managerial labor market, increases the fraction of ￿rms that use high-powered incentive
pay, raise the top earnings, and spread out the wage distribution.
The analysis is organized sequentially in two steps to solve the problems of "how to pay"
and "how much to pay". The ￿rst step is to endogenize the structure of managerial com-
pensation through optimal contractual choice between the owner of a ￿rm and its manager.
The owner hires a manager whose management a⁄ects the productivity of the ￿rm. Owing
to asymmetric information on unobservable managerial e⁄ort, a pay contract is designed to
induce desirable managerial incentives. Under the restriction of limited liability, the ￿rm￿ s
ability to punish bad management is limited by the manager￿ s wealth. This wealth constraint
is not binding for a manager with low talent, as the surplus created by his e⁄ort is so small
that he is able to purchase the surplus with his future income. The optimal pay contract is to
"sell the store" to the manager, who then becomes self-employed. However the surplus that
a su¢ ciently talented manager created is too large and beyond the manager￿ s future income
in a bad state. Then the wealth constraint binds, and the manager￿ s incentive is distorted.
Provided that the di⁄erence between good and bad management increases in the managerial
talent, the consequence of this distortion is more severe for more talented managers. For a
mediocre manager, the value created by his e⁄ort is not large enough, and the ￿rm is not
willing to sacri￿ce rents to solve a mild level of interest con￿ icts, and pay its manager by
a "￿xed-bonus" wage scheme. Only if a manager is talented enough does his e⁄ort have
su¢ cient value for the ￿rm. Then the owner is willing to o⁄er an equity-based contract to
share residual claims with the manager. Therefore, the heterogeneity in talent leads to the
heterogenous value of managerial e⁄ort, which in turn determines di⁄erent levels of agency
problems and di⁄erent pay structures.
After solving the problem of "how to pay", I integrate the limited liability ￿rms into a
standard monopolistic competition framework with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences to determine
the level of managerial pay. The monopolistic competition model possesses two key features
in the superstar literature pioneered by Rosen (1981): imperfect product substitution on
the demand side and economies of scale on the supply side. These two features permit the
ampli￿cation of managerial talent through resources controlled by a manager. The neat
properties of the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences allow me to establish a monotone relationship
3between talent, the market value of managerial e⁄orts, and ￿rm size. Endogenously, the
con￿ icts of interest between the owner and the manager inside a ￿rm increase in ￿rm size.
The sorting of people with heterogeneous managerial talent into pay contracts is tied to
￿rm size: small ￿rms are run by the self-employed who are of low talent; medium ￿rms hire
mediocre managers who in expectation receive a ￿xed salary; large ￿rms hire the most talented
managers and adopt a high-powered equity-based incentive scheme. The model is closed by a
market entry condition which divides people into two broad occupations: production workers
and managers.
If people￿ s generic talent is drawn from a Pareto distribution, the market equilibrium
displays several properties that ￿t empirical regularities on pay structure and wage distri-
bution. Firstly, most of the people are employed as production workers, self-employed and
salaried managers; only a small fraction of highly talented people manage large ￿rms and
receive equity-based incentive pay. Secondly, the wage distribution is skewed to the right,
being relatively even at the bottom and highly skewed at the top.
In the market equilibrium, both pay structures and pay levels are correlated with ￿rm
size. The market conditions that a⁄ect the distribution of ￿rm size will impact on the wage
distribution. For example, in a market where products are more homogeneous or the demand
elasticity is larger, resources are more disproportionately allocated towards the large ￿rms,
and the surviving conditions for small ￿rms are worsened. As a result, the threshold for
becoming a manager is higher, the proportion of the self-employed decreases, and a larger
fraction of ￿rms is willing to adopt the high-powered pay scheme. The adjustments in pay
structure and corresponding managerial e⁄orts lead to an increase in the average pay level
at the top distribution, a greater skewness of the wage earnings among the people who
receive high-powered performance pay, and a more dispersed wage distribution in the whole
population.
My analysis can be seen through the lens of an assignment model, in which people with
di⁄erent talent are assigned to ￿rms that have a di⁄erent size and adopt di⁄erent pay con-
tracts.1 The equilibrium wage distribution of the most talented people (CEOs) in my paper
resembles results derived from a competitive assignment between heterogenous CEO talent
and heterogeneous ￿rms (Tervio 2008; Gabaix and Landier 2008). My paper goes beyond
the assignment literature in two aspects. Firstly, I endogenize the distribution of ￿rm size,
which emerges as an equilibrium outcome instead of exogenously given. In this sense, my
paper is closer to the seminal work by Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982). Secondly and more
importantly, the matching between managers and ￿rms in my model is bonded by optimal
pay contracts to solve di⁄erent levels of agency problems. This allows me to trace the whole
wage distribution and address the substantial di⁄erences between the bottom and the top in
a coherent framework.
1Sattinger (1993) provides an excellent survey of the literature on assignment models and income distrib-
ution.
4My paper contributes to the literature that tries to embed a concrete structure inside
the ￿rm in a market equilibrium to understand the returns to managers and skilled workers.
Along the line of Calvo and Wellisz (1979) and Rosen (1982), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) build knowledge-hierarchies in a market equilibrium to analyze the earning distrib-
utions across ￿rms and within ￿rms. In contrast with their emphasis on the coordination
aspect of the ￿rm, my paper focuses on the incentive aspect of the ￿rm, which is a key to un-
derstanding ￿rm behavior and managerial pay contracts. Edmans et al (2009) and Bandiera
et al (2009) also model an incentive problem with CEOs in a talent assignment market equi-
librium, but their models do not endogenize the ￿rm size and relate the pay structure to
market structure.
Recent research on wage distribution has stressed the variations in income inequality,
particularly the surge of CEO pay and top income, over time (Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006;
Frydman and Sakes 2010; Atkinson et al 2011), between countries ( Kaplan 1994; Abowd and
Bognanno 1995; Atkinson and Piketty 2010), and across sectors (Gordon and Dew-Becker
2007; Kaplan and Rauh 2010). These observed heterogeneities challenge the traditional
explanations such as supply and demand of human capital and skill biased technological
change (Katz and Murphy 1992, Murphy and Welch 2001; Autor et al 2003). Several studies
have drawn attention to increasing returns to general, rather than speci￿c, human capital
(Murphy and Zabojnik 2004; Frydman 2007), loose discipline on managerial power (Bebchuk
and Fried 2004), and institutional factors (Piketty and Saez 2006; Levy and Temin 2007).
My paper o⁄ers a new explanation to highlight the role of the product market in a⁄ecting the
distribution of ￿rm size and thus the wage distribution. This explanation opens an avenue
for empirical research to examine the impact of market conditions such as demand elasticity
and ￿xed costs on the patterns of pay structure and wage distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, specifying the
￿rm structure and the market structure. Section 3 establishes the market equilibrium and
characterizes the equilibrium distribution of pay structure and wage level. Section 4 employs
a Pareto distribution of managerial talent to illustrate the main insights of the analysis.
Section 5 is devoted to comparative statics analysis. I conclude with a discussion of potential
extension of the paper. Proofs of propositions and lemmas are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
The economy has a continuum of people with a mass normalized to one. Each person is
endowed with one unit of homogenous raw labor and heterogenous managerial talent indexed
with a. I assume that managerial talent is single-dimensional, drawn from a continuous
distribution G(a) over (0;1) with a well-de￿ned probability density function g(a). In this
paper, managerial talent can be interpreted as entrepreneurship and general human capital,
which is not industry speci￿c and can be adapted to any technology.
5There exists a su¢ ciently large number of technologies in the economy. Each technology
produces one variety of goods, and has identical productivity ex ante. In order to activate
and operate a technology, the owner needs to hire a manager and production workers. For
simplicity, I assume that labor, either worker or manager, is the only input in production. A
technology can be thought of as a stock of capital. In this section, I will ￿rst model a modern
managerial ￿rm, in which ownership and control rights are separate and pay contracts play
a key role in inducing managerial incentives. Then I will specify the structure of the market
in which the ￿rms compete and the division of labor is determined.
2.1 The Firm
The ￿rm in this model departs from the neoclassical ￿rm in two aspects. Firstly, a manager
is indispensable for a ￿rm to organize production. In addition to the assumption that man-
agerial talent determines the initial productivity of a ￿rm following Lucas (1978), I assume
that a manager can adjust his e⁄ort to improve management that a⁄ects the productivity of
his ￿rm. Secondly, I admit the separation of ownership and control rights: a ￿rm is owned by
a collective of shareholders (the feminine principal), but is run by a manager (the masculine
agent). Potential agency problems such as moral hazard arise.
2.1.1 Hiring in The Labor Market
Before a ￿rm is formed, a principal who owns a production technology needs to hire a man-
ager from the labor market. I assume an extremely simple managerial labor market: no
mobility, that is, after being hired by a ￿rm, a manager cannot leave unless the ￿rm shuts
down. Implicitly, I assume that the searching costs in the labor market are extremely high.2
This assumption pushes down the outside option of the heterogenous managers to the same
minimum level, and allows the ￿rms to retain positive rent.3
Speci￿cally, the principal of a technology posts a managerial vacancy in the labor market.
After meeting a manager, the principal observes the manager￿ s talent and makes a take-it-
or-leave-it o⁄er to the manager. If the o⁄er is rejected, the principal will exit the market,
and the manager will choose the alternative occupation as a production worker. If the o⁄er
is accepted, a ￿rm is set up and starts to employ production workers, who will supply their
raw labor inelastically and receive a salary normalized to a unity.
2Alternatively, we can think of this as a random matching model, in which ￿rm productivity is match
speci￿c.
3In this model, the managerial talent is scarce while technology is abundant. If searching is costless, all the
rent will shift to the managers. As long as searching is imperfect, the qualitative results about pay structures in
my model will remain unchanged, although the split of surplus will depend on a potentially complex bargaining
process.
62.1.2 Contracting: A Limited Liability Model
I introduce inside the ￿rm a classic agency problem between the owner and the manager:
moral hazard with limited liability.4 Two key assumptions are imposed. Firstly, managerial
e⁄ort is unobservable, and the principal and the manager can only contract on observable
pro￿ts of the ￿rm. Secondly, both parties are risk neutral, but the pay contract is subject
to limited liability: the owner￿ s ability to reward (punish) the manager is constrained by the
latter￿ s wealth.
A ￿rm that hires a manager with talent a has initial productivity a. After exerting an
e⁄ort e, the manager can improve the ￿rm￿ s productivity to ’a; ’ > 1; with probability e
. This speci￿cation captures two features of a manager￿ s function: 1) the local public good
property of his service, which shifts up the ￿rm￿ s total factor productivity; 2) the uncertain
aspect of his service. The cost function of e takes a quadratic form 1
2ke2 with k > 0, satisfying
the regular convexity conditions. Note that I model the cost of managerial e⁄ort in terms
of the value of raw labor instead of disutility, following a broad interpretation of managerial
e⁄orts as investment in human capital.
The owner of the ￿rm maximizes her expected value by o⁄ering a wage pro￿le fb(’a);b(a);s(a)g,
where b(’a) is the contingent payment (bonus) to the manager in a good managerial state
when the ￿rm￿ s observed productivity is ’a, b(a) is the contingent payment in a bad man-
agerial state when the productivity remains at the initial level a, and s(a) is a non-contingent
transfer (￿ at salary) from the owner to the manager. For the moment, I assume that the
value of the ￿rm with productivity a takes a reduced form ￿(a;Z;￿), in which Z is a set
of endogenous variables such as price, quantity and employment of labor that the ￿rm will
optimally choose, and ￿ is a set of exogenous variables that the ￿rm will take as given. For
notational simplicity, I will write ￿(a;Z;￿) as ￿(a) whenever no confusion occurs.
Formally, the owner faces the following constrained optimization problem:
max
b(:); s(:)
e[￿(’a) ￿ b(’a)] + (1 ￿ e)[￿(a) ￿ b(a)] ￿ s(a) (1)
subject to
(PC) : eb(’a) + (1 ￿ e)b(a) ￿
1
2k
e2 + s(a) ￿ 1;
(IC) : e 2 argmax




(WC) : minfb(’a) + s(a);b(a) + s(a)g ￿ w:
Here PC is the participation constraint, meaning that the net return to the manager by
working for the ￿rm should be no less than his outside option as a production worker whose
wage is normalized to one; IC is the incentive compatibility constraint, as a rational manager
4See La⁄ont and Martimort (2002) for a textbook treatment.
7will maximize his expected payo⁄s; WC is the wealth constraint or limited liability constraint,
saying that regardless of the managerial state, the owner cannot pay the manager less than
w, which is exogenously imposed by legal institutions or social norms. I will restrict the
wealth constraint w < 1 to make the problem more interesting.5 I assume the existence of an
interior solution for the managerial e⁄ort e 2 (0;1) to capture the idea that no matter how
smart and diligent a manager is, the manager cannot ensure a hundred percent of success in
a complex business world. This interior solution is guaranteed by the assumption that k is
su¢ ciently small.
2.1.3 Optimal Pay Contract
The solution to the constrained optimization problem (1) critically depends on whether or
not the wealth constraint and the participation constraint are binding.
Lemma 1 At least one of the wealth constraint and the participation constraint has to bind
at optimum.
Proof. See the Appendix A1.
When the wealth constraint is relaxed, the ￿rst best level of e⁄ort can be implemented
even if the managerial e⁄ort is not observable, because the contracting parties are both risk
neutral.
Lemma 2 If and only if ￿(’a) ￿ ￿(a) <
q
2(1￿w)
k , the ￿rst best e⁄ort is implemented
eFB(a) = k[￿(’a) ￿ ￿(a)].
Proof. See the Appendix A2.
I call this type of contract "sell-the-store", since the ￿rst best e⁄ort is achieved by trans-
ferring ownership from the principal to the manager. Being a residual claimant, the manager
does not distort his incentive. The condition ￿(’a)￿￿(a) <
q
2(1￿w)
k ensures that the man-
ager can pay for the "store" ex post in both managerial states even if he has no wealth ex
ante. 6 The biting restriction is that a manager￿ s earnings at the low state must be large
enough to pay the price that the principal has set to extract all the surplus between good
and bad management created by the manager.
Lemma 3 Suppose the wealth constraint is binding.
1) When the participation constraint is binding (indicated by BP), the optimal contract takes
the form: fs(a) = w; b(a) = 0; bBP(’a) =
q
2(1￿w)




5When w ￿ 1, the participation constraint is always relaxed, and there will be only one type of optimal
pay contract as will be seen in the following analysis.
6This implies that the manager can use his future income on the job as collateral to purchase the ownership
ex ante. I rule out the possibility that people as share holders can collateralize their dividen income to purchase
the ￿rm.
82) When the participation constraint is relaxed (indicated by RP), the optimal contract is
fs(a) = w;b(a) = 0; bRP(’a) = 1
2[￿(’a)￿￿(a)]g; the managerial e⁄ort is eRP(a) = k
2[￿(’a)￿
￿(a)]:
Proof. See the Appendix A3.
This lemma is intuitive. The principal tries to use a contingent performance pay scheme
to induce managerial incentives by rewarding his good management and punishing his bad
management. However, the binding wealth constraint limits the principal￿ s ability to punish
bad management. Thus the principal has to rely more on rewards to induce desirable man-
agerial incentives. A high payment for good management induces a higher managerial e⁄ort,
but leaves a positive rent to the manager over his outside option. This trade-o⁄ between
inducing managerial e⁄ort and giving up the limited liability rent depends on whether or not
the participation constraint binds. A binding participation constraint implies that it is not
worthwhile giving up the rent. Then the principal pays a ￿xed amount based on whether the
productivity is improved, which will be referred to as a ￿xed-bonus contract. If the partici-
pation constraint is relaxed, the manager￿ s pay is tied to the value of the ￿rm, which I refer
to as an equity-based contract. Both types of pay scheme re￿ ect the contractual frictions due
to hidden actions, and only yield second best managerial e⁄orts.
2.1.4 Sorting
The above setup describes a situation, in which a principal, under the limited liability con-
straint, o⁄ers a menu of three types of contracts: "sell-the-store", ￿xed-bonus, and equity-
based. A manager who is aware of his own talent and the resulting ￿rm value, participates
in the managerial labor market. After the match, the managerial talent is revealed, and a
particular pay scheme from the menu is agreed upon.
The following assumption ensures positive sorting of talent into pay contracts.
Assumption 1 ￿￿(a) = ￿(’a) ￿ ￿(a) is monotonically increases in a.
The assumption implies that a more talented manager creates a larger di⁄erential in the
￿rm value between good and bad management, regardless of the endogenous variables Z
and the exogenous parameters ￿. The monotonicity can be derived from the the scale of
operations through the market or from the leverage of managerial talent inside the ￿rm. In
the next subsection, I will show that the assumption holds in a natural economic environment.
Together with the following technical assumption, the managers are sorted into three
types of pay contract.
Assumption 2 ￿￿(a) is continuous in a; lim
a!0
￿￿(a) = 0 and lim
a!1￿￿(a) = 1:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 and 2, the optimal contract is "sell-the-store" for a
manager with talent 0 < a ￿ a￿; ￿xed-bonus for a￿ < a ￿ a￿￿, and equity-based for a > a￿￿,
9where a￿ and a￿￿ are two threshold values of managerial talent such that ￿￿(a￿)2 = 2
k(1￿w)
and ￿￿(a￿￿)2 = 8
k(1￿ w).
Proof. See the Appendix A4.
From the perspective of managers, the three types of contracts can be interpreted as debt,
bond and stock. Managers with a di⁄erent level of talent invest their human capital in the
￿nancial market in a di⁄erent way. The least talented managers collateralize their future
income to borrow money to set up small ￿rms. This debt contract allows the managers to
become self-employed and residual claimants. The self-employed can be thought of as those
people who run a grocery store, open a hairdressing salon, or manage other small family
business.7 The mediocre managers invest a ￿xed amount of their human capital to buy a
bond that promises a ￿xed high pay in the good state and a ￿xed low pay in the bad state.
These managers bear very little risk, shielding themselves from the shocks in the market.
This type of contract is prevalent among managers in small ￿rms and in the low ranked
managerial profession. Examples are a division manager or a head of administrative sta⁄ in
a company, junior lawyers, investment bankers and consultants in professional service ￿rms.
The most talented managers, who expect to control abundant resources, purchase the stocks
of their ￿rms and share the overall risks together with the owners. This is a typical pay
scheme for CEOs and other senior managers in large companies.
I have de￿ned three managerial classi￿cations according to a manager￿ s pay contract: the
self-employed, the salaried managers with low-powered incentive pay (salaried managers for
simplicity) and the CEOs with high-powered incentive pay, corresponding to the three con-
tractual forms: "sell-the-store", ￿xed-bonus and equity-based respectively. The pay contract
determines how to share the surplus between the principal and the agent. The levels of the
joint surplus and managerial pay need to be pinned down in the market.
2.2 The Market
This section speci￿es the market structure in which I will embed the reduced-form ￿rms
described above. Following the spirit of Rosen (1981), I admit imperfect substitution of goods
in people￿ s consumption bundles and increasing returns to scale in production. In particular,
the economic environment is monopolistic competition with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The
monopolistic competition framework is highly tractable, and is suitable to analyze economy-
wide or broad-sector-wide phenomena, which are the focus of this paper.
7In this static model, I do not consider those start-ups that are run initially by self-employed entrepreneurs
and then grow up rapidly.
102.2.1 Preferences









where q! is the consumption of one variety of di⁄erentiated goods ! from an endogenized
continuum of bundles ￿. The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] measures the degree of substitutability
between any pair of di⁄erentiated varieties. The corresponding elasticity of substitution
is ￿ = 1
1￿￿ > 1: A larger ￿ or ￿ means that the varieties are more substitutable or less
di⁄erentiated.
It is well known that this Dixit-Stiglitz type of preference yields the demand for each
variety ! : q! = Q(
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1￿￿ is an aggregate price index. De￿ne aggregate spending R ￿ PQ: Then




The production technology features increasing returns to scale. A ￿rm with productivity a
produces q units of ￿nal products at costs c(q) =
q
a+F in terms of the homogenous raw labor.
Here 1
a is the marginal cost, and F is the irreversible ￿xed costs such as overhead costs and
distribution costs. Within a ￿rm, there are no decreasing returns to scale in the managerial
talent. The span of managerial control is disciplined by the speci￿city of the management to
a particular ￿rm, whose output is constrained by market demand.
2.2.3 Market Structure
The market structure is monopolistic competition. A ￿rm obtains a certain degree of monop-
olistic power to cover ￿xed costs. Given the above preferences and production technology, the





Therefore, the demand and revenue for a variety produced with productivity a are respec-
tively
q(a) = Q(a￿P)￿ and r(a) = R(a￿P)￿￿1:
The relative sales and relative revenues of two ￿rms with di⁄erent productivity can be












)￿￿1; for all i; j 2 ￿: (3)
These relations show that more productive ￿rms produce more and have a larger size. In other
words, more talented managers tend to control more resources and generate more surplus,
11since the ￿rm productivity is derived from the managerial talent.








Corresponding to the earlier notation of a ￿rm￿ s value function, the endogenous variables
in Z can be written as a function of a and the exogenous variables ￿ = fR;P;￿;Fg. Hence
￿(a;Z;￿) is reduced to ￿(a;￿), and ￿￿(a) = (’￿￿1 ￿ 1)R
￿(a￿P)￿￿1. Assumption 1 and 2
are satis￿ed.
2.2.4 Contracts across Firm Size
The above parsimonious economic environment establishes a one-to-one mapping between
the surplus created by managerial e⁄orts and ￿rm size. The latter is measured by its revenue
when the ￿rm operates at its initial productivity. A direct extension of Proposition 1 yields
the following result.





k ] ; a ￿rm will adopt a ￿xed-bonus pay contract when its size is medium:








k ] ; a ￿rm will adopt an equity-based pay contract





This corollary captures the relationship between ￿rm size and the level of agency problems.
Potentially the con￿ icts of interest between the principal and the agent increase in ￿rm size,
because the marginal value of managerial e⁄ort is greater in larger ￿rms. The presence of
optimal contracts changes this monotonic relationship. When a ￿rm is small, the manager is
able to purchase the store and becomes a residual claimant. The agency problem is eliminated.
When operating on a large scale, a ￿rm is willing to use an equity-based contract to induce
managerial e⁄orts, and the agency problem is mitigated. The medium ￿rms su⁄er most from
the agency problem, as a high-powered incentive scheme is too costly.
The result that the power of incentives increases in managerial talent and ￿rm size among
the top managers (CEOs) is consistent with recent empirical ￿ndings. Based on a detailed
survey on senior managers in Italian ￿rms, Bandiera et al (2009) ￿nd that more talented
managers are matched with ￿rms that have a larger size and o⁄er deeper contracts, and work
harder. Using CEO pay data of large companies in the US, Gayle and Miller (2010) ￿nd a
positive relationship between higher equity incentives and ￿rm size.
The optimal pay contracts determine the optimal managerial e⁄orts and pay levels. For
the self-employed who run small ￿rms, and the mediocre managers who run medium ￿rms,
their pay, net of the compensation to their e⁄orts, equals their outside option, since their
participation constraint binds. Only in the large pay-by-equity ￿rms does the net managerial
compensation, Vm(a) = w + k
8(’￿￿1 ￿ 1)2[
r(a)
￿ ]2, increase in ￿rm size.
12The expected value of a ￿rm with initial productivity a can be obtained by substituting











￿ (1 + F); (4)
V Bonus
f (a) = [
p
2k(1 ￿ w)(’￿￿1 ￿ 1) + 1]
r(a)
￿












￿ (w + F);
where the superscript Sell indicates the "sell-the-store" contract, Bonus indicates the ￿xed-
bonus contract, and Equity indicates the equity-based contract. Figure 1 depicts the value
function of the ￿rm Vf and the net managerial pay Vm. The former is strictly increasing in
￿rm size/talent, and the latter is weakly increasing in ￿rm size/talent.
3 Equilibrium
I have solved the problem of "how to pay", taking the market conditions as given. The level
of pay ought to be pinned down in a market equilibrium, in which the following conditions
are satis￿ed: 1) all manager-￿rm matches are stable; 2) pay contracts are optimally designed,
and managers exert optimal e⁄orts; 3) all the people optimally choose their occupations; 4)
a ￿rm is active if and only if it receives a non-negative expected payo⁄; 5) both the labor
market and the product market clear.
3.1 Market Entry and Stable Matching
The matching between ￿rms and managers is bonded by di⁄erent types of pay contract. Given
the contracting environment and market conditions, the pay contracts are optimally designed
by the ￿rms, and the managers choose their optimal e⁄orts accordingly. The stability of the
matching is constructed by assumption, and is stable in the sense that given the contractual
constraints, no manager/￿rm pair wishes to rematch with another ￿rm/manager. This can be
seen from Figure 1. Both the value of ￿rms and the pay to managers increase in managerial
talent. The joint surplus created by a match strictly increases in a single factor representing
both managerial talent and ￿rms￿initial productivity. The result is (second best) e¢ cient
given the limited liability constraint.
The managerial jobs are created by the ￿rms. A ￿rm will enter the market if and only if
its expected value is non-negative, that is, the expected pro￿ts net of the pay to the manager
and workers should be large enough to cover the ￿xed costs, F. Therefore the marginal
￿rm/manager will be pinned down by the zero ￿rm value condition: Vf(a) = 0.8 The size of
￿xed costs will select di⁄erent types of ￿rm, pay contract, and managers into the market. For






13example, if ￿xed costs are too large, small ￿rms cannot survive, the "sell-the-store" contract
is not feasible, and the class of the self-employed vanishes. Unless otherwise speci￿ed, I make
the following assumption on the size of the ￿xed costs to activate all the three types of pay
contracts.
Assumption 3 The ￿xed costs F are su¢ ciently small so that some self-employed ￿rms can
survive in the market. 9
3.2 Market Clearing
Clearing the labor market requires that every person in the economy is employed, either
as a worker or as a manager. All the production workers are fully absorbed by all the
active ￿rms. Denote the number of employed managers M ￿
1 Z
a
g(a)da, which is also the
number of active ￿rms. The supply of raw labor is simply 1 ￿ M. The demand for raw




a g(a)da . The ￿rst term captures the labor required for each ￿rm to





’a + [1 ￿ e(a)]
q(a)
a is an integrated term, indicating the expected variable raw labor
demanded by a ￿rm that hires a manager with talent a, who exerts e⁄ort and has a probability
e(a) to improve the ￿rm￿ s productivity to ’a. I assume that all managers work independently.
Then by the law of large number, e(a) can be regarded as the proportion of ￿rms that
successfully improve their productivity among the ￿rms with initial productivity a.10 In
equilibrium, labor demand equals labor supply:





g(a)da = 1 ￿ M: (5)
The aggregate income of the population includes the total wages to all production workers
















revenue of the largest ￿rm that adopts the "sell-the-store" contract.








’) + [1 ￿ e(a)]g(a) if a ￿ ’a;
= [1 ￿ e(a)]g(a) if a ￿ a ￿ ’a:
The ex post productivity of the ex ante least productive ￿rm in a good managerial state is ’a. So the ￿rms
with ex post productivity between [a;’a] are those whose managers have talent in this domain and do not
succeed in improving productivity. The ￿rms with ex post productivity a > ’a may come from two sources:1)
the ￿rms run by managers with talents a > ’a but fails to improve productivity and 2) those run by managers
with talent
a
’ but in a good managerial state. This ex post approach will give the same result as the ex ante
approach that I adopt in this paper.
14and managers and the dividend income for all share holders.11 Clearing the product market
requires that the total expenditure (the total income) equals the total market value of output
(the total revenues):













where r(a) = e(a)r(’a) + [1 ￿ e(a)]r(a) is the expected revenue of a ￿rm that employs a
manager with talent a. The overall revenue R is exhausted by the total payment to production
workers, the total managerial pay, and the total dividend payment to shareholders. Market
clearing in the labor market and the product market boils down to the same condition, as the




p(a) and r(’a) = ’￿￿1r(a), I rewrite (5) as
1 Z
a
[e(a)(’￿￿1 ￿ 1) + 1](
￿ ￿ 1
￿
)r(a)g(a)da = 1 ￿ M(1 + F): (6)
In general, r(a) and e(a) are functions of the unknown aggregates R and P. Fortunately,
by (3), r(a) = (a
a)￿￿1r(a), where r(a) can be computed from the zero ￿rm value condition
Vf(a) = 0: Moreover e(a) can be expressed in terms of a; a and the parameters, using the
relative relationships between managerial e⁄ort and talent according to the optimal contract.
Therefore, the market clearing condition (6) pins down the equilibrium cuto⁄ value a, which
in turn determines the equilibrium threshold values a￿ and a￿￿. With these threshold values,
the equilibrium distribution of the choice of managerial contracts, managerial e⁄orts, ￿rm
productivity and ￿rm size (revenues), together with the equilibrium aggregates (M;R;P;Q);
can be computed accordingly. Finally the distribution of managerial pay can be characterized.
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this subsection, I show that there always exists a unique equilibrium (a;a￿;a￿￿;M;R;P;Q)
in the economy. The cuto⁄ ￿rm productivity and the marginal managerial talent in the
market is determined by V Sell
f (a) = 0. This pins down the revenue of the marginal ￿rm and




1 + 2k(’￿￿1 ￿ 1)2(F + 1)




1 + 2k(’￿￿1 ￿ 1)2(F + 1)
’￿￿1 ￿ 1
;
11For simplicity, I assume that all the ￿rms￿pro￿ts are redistributed to their shareholders, and the shares
held by a person is proportional to his or her wage income. So the wage inequality is an index of income
inequality as well.
15which only depend on parameters. Without causing confusion, I denote r = r(a) and e =
e(a).









k , where a￿ identi￿es the manager/￿rm that is indi⁄erent be-
tween the "sell-the-store" contract and the ￿xed-bonus contract, and a￿￿ identi￿es the pair
that is indi⁄erent between the ￿xed-bonus contract and the equity-based contract. Through














Then, it is straightforward to establish the relationship between managerial e⁄ort and man-




)￿￿1e for a 2 [a;a￿]; (9)
e(a) =
p






for a 2 [a￿￿;1):
Substituting these equations in the market clearing condition (6), the equilibrium marginal
managerial talent and the division between the working class and the managerial class are
determined.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique cuto⁄ managerial talent a such that people with tal-
ent above a become managers, and people with talent below a are production workers. This
equilibrium cuto⁄ value is determined by the market clearing condition:








+ (￿ ￿ 1)
1 Z
a
(’￿￿1 ￿ 1) ￿ e(a) ￿
r(a)
￿ | {z }
intensive margin
g(a)da = 1 ￿ M: (10)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The left hand side of Equation (10) is labor demand, which is downward sloping in a. An
increase in the cuto⁄ managerial talent will generate two e⁄ects on labor demand. Firstly,
the number of operating ￿rms is reduced and thus the economy demands fewer production
workers to bear the ￿xed and the variable costs. This is the adjustment at the extensive
margin, captured by the term in the bracket. Secondly, the managers who remain in the
market adjust their e⁄orts. The managers adapt their e⁄orts relative to that of the marginal
manager, which absorbs the general equilibrium e⁄ect and is ￿xed by market conditions. By
(9), all managers, except for those who exert constant amount of e⁄orts, work less hard since
their comparative advantages relative to the marginal manager are reduced. As a result,
16a smaller proportion of the surviving ￿rms improve their productivity, and the demand for
labor decreases. This adjustment at the intensive margin is captured by the second term.
The right hand side of Equation (10) is the supply of raw labor, which increases in a, as
fewer managers/￿rms release more production workers into the economy. The two curves
intersect at a single point, which pins down the equilibrium marginal managerial talent/ ￿rm
productivity.
3.4 Occupational Strati￿cation and Wage Distribution
In equilibrium, the cuto⁄ value a divides the population into two broad occupational classes:
production workers and managers. Then the threshold values a￿ and a￿￿ re￿ne the managerial
occupation further into three classi￿cations, identi￿ed by their pay structures. In particular,
the least talented people with a 2 (0;a) choose their occupation as workers and receive a
￿ at salary; people with low talent a 2 [a;a￿) become self-employed and residual claimants;
mediocre people with talent a 2 [a￿;a￿￿) are salaried managers who earn a ￿xed-bonus that
yields a constant expected pay level; the most talented people with a 2 [a￿￿;1) are CEOs
and paid by an equity-based scheme.
We can construct measures of the relative prevalence of each type of pay scheme and the

















The wage distribution of the whole population follows immediately. A person￿ s expected
wage W(a) = Vm(a) +
e(a)2
2k consists of the net value of expected managerial pay and a
compensation for managerial e⁄orts. I write W(a) as a function of the ￿rm￿ s revenue r(a),
which in turn is a monotone function of managerial talent:
WPW(a) = 1 for a 2 (0;a) ; (12)




￿2 r(a)2 for a 2 [a;a￿];
WSM(a) = 2 ￿ w for a 2 [a￿;a￿￿];




￿2 r(a)2 for a 2 [a￿￿;1);
where the superscripts PW;SE;SM and CEO indicate worker, self-employed, salaried man-
ager and CEO respectively. Figure 2 depicts the wage curve in terms of managerial talent,
combined with the strati￿cation of occupations. The workers simply earn the unity wage.
The self-employed earn their outside option as a worker and a variable part to compensate
their e⁄orts. The salaried managers receive a constant wage to compensate their outside
option and the ￿xed amount of e⁄ort. They earn the same amount of wage because of their
17pay structure in spite of the heterogeneity in their generic talent. Finally, the earnings of
the CEOs increase rapidly in their talent, as they share the pro￿ts of the ￿rms.12 This rich
picture of wage distribution generated from the theoretical model can be used to address a
range of current debates about managerial compensation and wage inequality.
Managerial Wage Premium The population is divided into two classes. The manager-
ial class earns a premium over the working class because they activate their managerial talent,
exert e⁄orts (invest in human capital), and are rewarded through a di⁄erent pay structure.







This is also a measure of the managerial premium, given the normalization of the workers￿
wage.
Wage Distribution among Managers One main prediction of the model is about the
wage distribution within the managerial class. Being a manager does not necessarily yield a
high wage income. The self-employed don￿ t su⁄er from any agency problem, but their pay is
constrained by their small market value. The pay to the salaried managers is constrained by
their pay contract. Only when a manager is talented enough to become a CEO will his pay
be ampli￿ed by a large scale of market value.

















Then the average managerial pay can be decomposed as
f WM = ￿ ￿ f WSE + ￿￿ ￿ f WSM + ￿￿￿ ￿ f WCEO.
CEO Pay It is of particular interest to look at the wage distribution of the CEOs, who
are identi￿ed by the equity-based pay structure in this model. The wage function of the CEOs
WCEO(a) is proportional to a2(￿￿1), provided that w is very small. A su¢ ciently large ￿ will
yield a convex relation between managerial pay and managerial talent, leading to a superstar
phenomenon as in Rosen (1981).13 This convexity creates a large wage dispersion among
12From the wage function for the CEOs, the elasticity of CEO pay with respect to ￿rm size is a constant 2,
which is much larger than the empirical constant 0.3 discussed by Rosen (1982), Gabaix and Landier (2008)
and Frydman and Saks (2010) . This can be reconciled by revising the quadratic cost function of managerial
e⁄ort to a higher power function.
13There is no consensus of the value of the parameter ￿. But a value between 3 and 10 is used in the
literature.




Suppose ￿ = 8. This implies the price is about 14% higher than the marginal cost. If manager
i is 10% more talented than manager j, the pay to the smarter manager will be about 280%
higher than the pay to the less smart one.14
Wage Inequality Concerning both the inequality between the workers and the managers
and the inequality within the managerial class, one can use the Theil index to measure the











where f W =
1 Z
0
W(a)g(a)da is the average wage of the whole population.
4 Pareto Distribution
In order to generate sharper empirical implications, I specify the generic talent distribution
as a Pareto distribution. The use of the Pareto distribution is not only for its technical
convenience, but for its empirical relevance. Pareto distribution has been used to characterize
income distribution and inequality (Arnold 1983), the distribution of ￿rm size (Axtell 2001),
and ￿rm productivity (Helpman et al 2010). Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that a Pareto
type distribution of top talents can be obtained through random draws from a large family
of extreme value distributions. A large body of recent empirical literature use the Pareto
distribution to interpolate the top wage distribution across di⁄erent countries (see Atkinson
et al 2011 for a survey).
Suppose the talent distribution G(a) = 1￿a￿￿ over (0;1), where ￿ governs the shape of
the distribution and the measure of talent inequality.15 A larger ￿ means a ￿ atter distribution
and a smaller inequality. When ￿ ! 1, the distribution collapses at a single point and stands
for extreme equality. To guarantee the existence of a meaningful solution to the economic
system in the previous sections, I impose the restriction ￿ > 2(￿ ￿ 1).
After some manipulation, the market clearing condition (10) can be written as









[￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)][￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)]
(13)
￿
2(1 ￿ w)(￿ ￿ 1)







14Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008) generate a larger pay di⁄erential for CEOs with a smaller
talent di⁄erential. The ampli￿cation e⁄ect can be enhanced in my model by introducing capital in the
production function or by allowing a team of managers whose talent is complementary inside the ￿rm.
15With a Pareto distribution of the form G(x) = 1 ￿ (
b
x)
￿ where b > 0;￿ > 1;x ￿ b, the regular Gini index
can be calculated as (2￿ ￿ 1)
￿1.
19which determines the unique equilibrium triple of threshold values (a;a￿;a￿￿).
The relative prevalence of each type of pay contracts and the relative employment of each
type of manager de￿ned in (11) can be computed as follows:























is bounded from above by 1
3 when 2(￿￿1) approaches towards ￿. The
ratio shows that the equity-based contract is less common than the ￿xed-bonus contract, or
CEOs account for a smaller portion than salaried managers within the managerial occupation.
Under the Pareto speci￿cation, we can easily characterize the wage distribution in the
economy. On the left side of the distribution, a share of the population, 1￿a￿￿; are production
workers who receive a unity wage, despite that they di⁄er in their managerial talent. The
wage of the self-employed consists of two parts, a ￿xed compensation for their outside option
and a variable compensation for their e⁄orts. The second component is drawn from a Pareto
distribution with a shape parameter ￿
￿￿2(￿￿1) and being truncated by
e2
2k from below and by
1￿w from above. Then appear a mass of mediocre managers who in expectation earn a ￿xed
wage 2￿w. Finally the CEOs on the right tail of the distribution receive a constant w , and
a variable component drawn from a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter ￿
2(￿￿1) and
with a minimum value 2(1 ￿ w).
This equilibrium wage distribution matches two well-established regularities in the distri-
bution of labor earnings. Firstly, the empirical earning distribution tends to be skewed to the
right and display long right tails. The right skewness of the wage distribution in my model
inherits the property of the Pareto distribution of talent. But the presence of the two mass
points (production workers and the salaried managers) makes the distribution incline toward
a log-normal distribution, which ￿ts better the empirical patterns. Secondly, the top income
distribution is highly skewed, and the top percentiles of earnings account for a dispropor-
tionate share of total earnings. This can be seen from the distribution of CEO pay in the
model. The shape parameter of the generic talent distribution ￿ is scaled down by a factor
1
2(￿￿1). For a reasonable parameter value of ￿, this market rescaling e⁄ect can transform a
fairly even talent distribution into a substantially skewed wage distribution in favor of the
top earnings.
By the properties of Pareto distribution, the average pay to the self-employed and to the
20CEOs are








a )￿￿ ; (15)
f WCEO = w + 2(1 ￿ w)
￿
￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
.
Substituting the share of each type of ￿rm and the average wage of each type of manager,
the average managerial pay can be written as




￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ (1 ￿ w)
2(￿ ￿ 1)







The average wage in the economy is
f W = G(a) + [1 ￿ G(a)]f WM
= 1 + a￿￿ e2
2k
￿
￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ (a￿)￿￿(1 ￿ w)
2(￿ ￿ 1)




Then the Theil index can be computed accordingly.
5 Comparative Statics
One in￿ uential explanation for the recent pattern of wage distribution highlights the role
of ￿rm size distribution in amplifying CEO pay (Baker and Hall 2004; Gabaix and Landier
2008). However, the distribution of ￿rm size and the wage distribution are a joint equilibrium
outcome, as established in my theory. Firm size provides an intermediate channel to shape
the wage distribution, but is not an ultimate source or an exogenous shock that causes the
wage distribution. In this section, I identify a number of factors that have a potential impact
on the patterns of ￿rm size. I conduct comparative statics on the structural parameters in
the model to derive empirically testable predictions. To facilitate the analysis, I maintain the
assumption that managerial talent is Pareto distributed.
5.1 Demand Elasticity
In Rosen (1981), a key factor that generates the superstar phenomenon is the disproportion-
ate demand for high quality against low quality. For example, an excellent singer attracts
more than double the audience than two mediocre singers. Technological advances such as
television or the Internet that increase the accessibility of goods tend to enhance the demand
for superstars and reduce the demand for mediocrity. In the Dixit-Stiglitz preference (2), the
parameter ￿ governs the substitutability between goods and the demand elasticity. Although
not able to capture precisely the quality-quantity trade-o⁄ in Rosen (1981), this parame-
ter re￿ ects the idea that demand elasticity varies across consumers with inherently di⁄erent
21preferences or across markets with di⁄erent levels of market access and searching costs. In-
tuitively when goods are treated as more substitutable or less di⁄erentiated, consumers shift
their demand more easily, and ￿rms gain more from improvements in productivity. Therefore
a larger demand elasticity increases the marginal value of managerial e⁄ort, which creates
the surplus between good and bad management. Bene￿ting more from an increase in the
demand elasticity, larger ￿rms are more willing to use the equity-based incentive scheme.
This response triggers a series of responses in the market.
Proposition 3 Greater substitutability between goods or a larger demand elasticity in a mar-
ket leads to the following results:
1) The talent threshold for becoming a manager increases, and the employment of managers
decreases;
2) The fraction of the self-employed decreases; the fraction of CEOs among the managerial
class increases;
3) Both the average CEO pay and the wage inequality among CEOs increase.
Proof. See Appendix A6.
The ￿rst result is the selection e⁄ect. A larger demand elasticity enables larger ￿rms to
grab a larger market share, which in turn worsens the surviving environment of small ￿rms
and drives out the marginal ones. This selection at the entry margin reinforces the allocation
of resources from smaller to larger ￿rms. As a result, the fraction of the self-employed
decreases while the fraction of the CEOs who receive high-powered incentives increases. The
impact on the fraction of the salaried managers is ambiguous, because they erode the market
of the self-employed, but su⁄er from the pressure from the CEOs. These results hold for a
general class of talent distribution other than the Pareto distribution.
The e⁄ects of an increase in the demand elasticity on wage distribution are more complex.
The CEOs always gain from the resource reallocation towards larger ￿rms. Because of the
Pareto distribution, it is easy to show that the average CEO pay increases; within the CEOs,
the wage distribution becomes more skewed since the superstars control more resources and
work harder. However, the average pay to the whole managerial class does not necessarily
increase, because the average pay to the self-employed may decrease. Only when the fraction
of the self-employed is small does the ambiguity disappear. For example, suppose a￿
a = 1 so
that the whole segment of the self-employed vanishes. Then upon an increase in the demand
elasticity, the proportion of CEOs expands at the cost of the salaried managers, leading to
a larger inequality within the managers and a higher managerial wage premium over the
working class.
The class of the self-employed plays an interesting role in bu⁄ering the impact of the
changes in demand elasticity on the wage inequality among the whole population. When
the average pay to the self-employed decreases, the inequality within the managerial class
increases, but the inequality between managers and production workers is dampened. In
22contrast, if the average pay to the self-employed increases, this between-group inequality
always increases while the within-manager inequality may be reduced.
In the monopolistic competition model with Dixit-Stiglitz preference, the demand elas-
ticity ￿ is negatively related to the price-cost margin of a ￿rm. Therefore a larger ￿ implies
more intense market competition in the sense of more aggressive interactions between ￿rms.
This notion of market competition is also aligned with a new indicator of competition in a
market with heterogenous ￿rms, using relative pro￿t di⁄erences between ￿rms (Boone 2008).
The above discussion is thus related to the literature on the impact of market competition
on managerial incentives (e.g. Hermalin 1992; Schmidt 1997; Raith 2003; Vives 2008). In
their homogenous ￿rm setting, they emphasize a trade-o⁄between market enlargement (busi-
ness stealing) and higher competitive pressure (business stolen); the e⁄ect of tougher market
competition on managerial incentives is in general ambiguous.16 In my model with heteroge-
nous ￿rms, I emphasize the uneven impact of market competition across ￿rms; competition
on average improves managerial incentives and compensation, largely because of ￿rms￿ad-
justment at the extensive margin. This provides a potential explanation for the empirical
￿ndings that more intense market competition tends to improve managerial incentives and in-
crease the power of incentive pay for executives (Cunat and Guadalupe 2005, 2009). But the
heterogenous e⁄ects of competition across ￿rms with di⁄erent productivity calls for further
examination.
5.2 Fixed Costs
Fixed costs are an important determining factor of market structure. Firms need to be able
to recover ￿xed costs to survive market competition. The magnitude of ￿xed costs determines
the size of the marginal ￿rm and the number of ￿rms in the market. In an economic sector
with heterogenous ￿rms, an increase in ￿xed costs tends to select better ￿rms, which induces
resources reallocated from smaller to larger ￿rms. In the current model, this selection leads to
a general equilibrium e⁄ect that triggers a series of changes inside the ￿rms, and then a⁄ects
the aggregate levels of the employment of managers and the distribution of their wages.
Proposition 4 A larger ￿xed cost F leads to the following results:
1) The talent threshold for becoming a manager increases, and the employment of managers
decreases;
2) Among the managers, the fraction of the self-employed declines, but the fractions of the
salaried managers and the CEOs increase;
3) The managerial wage premium increases.
Proof. See the Appendix A7.
16The exception is Raith (2003), which shows that competition(e.g. greater substitutablity between goods)
unambiguously increases managerial incentives in a product di⁄erentiation model when market entry is endo-
genized.
23These results are intuitive. Larger ￿xed costs require a larger expected ￿rm value to
induce market entry. The marginal ￿rm needs to hire a more talented manager. As a
result, more resources (raw labor) are available for the surviving ￿rms. Since larger ￿rms
have a larger demand and their managers work harder, they will absorb more resources, and
worsen the operating conditions for the self-employed whose activities are of a small scale.
In equilibrium, the range of talent between the self-employed and the salaried manager is
reduced (a￿
a decreases). Given the Pareto distribution of talent, people with higher talent
are more scarce, and a smaller fraction of the self-employed implies a reduction in their
employment. On the contrary, larger ￿rms are less a⁄ected, and the shares of the salaried
managers and the CEOs among the surviving managers increase.
Unlike the demand elasticity, ￿xed costs have no direct impact on a ￿rm￿ s behavior. An
increase in ￿xed costs changes the wage distribution only through the composition of di⁄erent
types of managers. Larger ￿xed costs can increase or decrease the average pay to the self-
employed, depending on the response of the boundary conditions of a and a￿. The average
pay to the salaried managers is independent of ￿xed costs because of the nature of their pay
contracts. The average pay to the CEOs is not a⁄ected as the lower bound of the distribution
of their wages is not a⁄ected by ￿xed costs.17 Under the Pareto distribution, larger ￿xed
costs increase the average managerial wage premium, because of a larger share of the salaried
managers and CEOs who earn a higher wage than the self-employed.
In the above analysis, I maintain the assumption that ￿xed costs are su¢ ciently small so
that the three types of pay structures coexist in the market. If ￿xed costs are large, not all
the types of pay contracts can be active in the market. Collecting the notations in (4) and
(8), we have the following result.
Corollary 2 If the ￿xed cost F is large enough so that the cuto⁄ managerial talent is de-
termined by V
Equity
f (a) = 0, all surviving ￿rms adopt the equity-based contract; if the ￿xed
cost F is intermediate so that the cuto⁄ managerial talent is determined by V Bonus
f (a) = 0,
￿rms with productivity between a and a￿￿ will choose the ￿xed-bonus contract, and ￿rms with
productivity above a￿￿ choose the equity-based contract.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 2 convey the idea that ￿xed costs act as a selection mechanism
of the contractual forms. They make empirically testable predictions about the composition
of talent and managerial pay structures across sectors with di⁄erent ￿xed costs. A fragmented
market, where ￿xed costs are small (e.g. local service), accommodates a wider range of talent
and more diversity of pay structure. The self-employed earn a niche, and the equity-based
pay scheme is less prevalent. In contrast, in a condensed market where ￿xed costs are large
(e.g. modern manufacturing), only highly productive ￿rms can survive, only talented people
can take the occupation as a manager, and the high-powered equity-based of pay scheme
becomes more popular.
17This result depends on the special property of Pareto distribution, but the idea that ￿xed costs only a⁄ect
boundary conditions holds for general distributions .
245.3 Talent Distribution
In the model, the absolute level of labor supply plays no role in a⁄ecting the patterns of pay
structure and wage distribution. This is because with the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, a change
in the absolute supply of labor will translate into the number of ￿rms in a ￿xed proportion,
leaving the distribution of ￿rm size constant. What plays an important role for the patterns
of ￿rm size and managerial pay is the parameter ￿, which governs the shape of the Pareto
distribution of talent.
Consider an extreme example such that ￿ ! 1: people have equally low managerial
talent. Then some people will be randomly selected to operate a technology. Given the scale
of their operations is small, the "sell-the-store" contractual arrangement is optimal. The
economy will be preoccupied by the small self employed ￿rms. The wage inequality is low,
because none of the people has the opportunity to amplify their talent through a large scale
of operations. When ￿ decreases, the talent distribution has a longer right tail and becomes
less equal. This supports the existence of large ￿rms that face the principal-agent problem
and have to adopt second best pay contracts. For a su¢ ciently large ￿, the type of large ￿rms
that adopt the equity-based incentive scheme emerges. The presence of this pay structure
makes the wage distribution more sensitive to market conditions and talent distribution. A
further reduction in ￿ increases the average CEO pay and the wage dispersion among CEOs.
The implication from this simple exercise is that the supply of human capital does matter
for wage distribution, but in a way other than the traditional labor supply story. The
talent composition of human capital will a⁄ect the distribution of ￿rm size, the demand
for managerial e⁄orts, and the pay structure and pay level. For example, more imbalance in
managerial ability among people due to MBA education or the migration of top talent can
drive up the top income inequality. From an international perspective, the talent distribution
of the American labor forces is arguably more skewed than that of the European and Japanese
labor forces (Grossman and Maggi 2000). My analysis implies that the top wage income
inequality would be more pronounced in the US than in Europe and Japan holding other
structural parameters constant, which seems consistent with the empirical ￿ndings.
5.4 Limited Liability Constraint
In the limited liability model, the parameter w indicates the minimum wealth that a person
needs to have to shield away from a negative shock. In an economy where people are not
endowed with wealth as I have assumed, w is the wage that the ￿rm must pay its manager
for bad management. It re￿ ects the level of labor rigidity or contractual frictions in the
principal-agent relation. A lower w means that the managerial labor market is more ￿ exible,
and the institutional environment allows the principal to share more risk with the agent.
Changing w has a direct impact on the self-employed. A relaxation in w increases the range
of the ￿rms that can sell their "stores" to the manager, and thus enlarges the fraction of the
self-employed in the economy. On the other hand, the fraction of either the salaried managers
25or the CEOs is reduced. Upon a reduction in w , the salaried managers will work harder and
receive higher compensation. The average CEO pay increases accordingly. The responses of
the whole managerial class worsen the surviving condition for small ￿rms, push up the talent
threshold for becoming a manager, and increases the average managerial pay.
In an extreme case, w ! ￿1. The wealth constraint is always relaxed. Then all ￿rms
will adopt the "sell-the-store" contract and all managers will exert the ￿rst best level of
e⁄orts. The economy will achieve ￿rst best e¢ ciency but feature a higher level of inequality.
This is in the line with the traditional argument about the trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and
inequality.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have developed a general equilibrium model to analyze the patterns of pay
structure and wage distribution among people with di⁄erent managerial talent and in ￿rms
with di⁄erent size. Ex ante more talented people will control more resources ex post. This
scale of operations e⁄ect on the one hand ampli￿es the market value of people￿ s talent, but on
the other hand creates potential con￿ icts of interest in the principal-agent relation. Di⁄erent
pay contracts are optimally designed to mitigate agency problems inside the ￿rms, resulting
in substantial heterogeneities in pay structure and in the extent of the scale of operations.
People with low talent work as a residual income recipient in self-employment. They don￿ t
su⁄er from agency problems, but their wages are limited by the small scale of their activities.
Managers with intermediate talent run medium ￿rms, and receive a salary with low-powered
incentives. They have the most serious agency problem, and their pay is not at all ampli￿ed
by the market. Only highly talented people will manage large ￿rms and share the market
value of their ￿rms. High-powered incentive pay and large scales of operations are the cause
of disproportionately large wage earnings at the top distribution of talent, and are the main
source of income inequality in an economy.
Without much speculation on parameter values, the model generates predictions that ￿t
several empirical regularities. Moreover, within the model, I identify factors such as increases
in demand elasticity and ￿xed costs, which lead to a tighter market structure (fewer but
larger ￿rms/managers in the market), as the explanation of the surging top income and the
increasing inequality between the working rich and the working poor. Another factor along
this line is international trade, which induces resources reallocated from smaller domestic
￿rms towards larger exporting ￿rms within the same industries (Melitz 2003). In a separate
paper, I extend the current model to an open economy to examine the impact of intra-industry
international trade on pay structure and wage inequality (Wu 2011).
In the current paper, I focus on the incentive aspect of the ￿rm without considering the
hierarchical structure inside the ￿rm. Managers are classi￿ed only by their pay structures.
I do not distinguish a manager of a medium ￿rm from a division manager in a large ￿rm if
26they receive the same type of pay contract. Future research will be devoted to re￿ning the
classi￿cation of managers through integrating the incentive aspect and other aspects of the
￿rm, as pointed out by Rosen (1992). This extension will address the substantial observed
heterogeneities in the pay structure and pay level across managers both within and across
￿rms. Another extension is to relax the assumption of non-mobility in the managerial labor
market. Mobility and turnovers of managers will bring about the discussion of general versus
speci￿c human capital and career concerns, which are important for the determination of
managerial compensation.
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7 APPENDIX
Proof of Propositions and Lemmas
A1. Lemma 1
Proof. In the limited liability model, at least one of the participation constraint (PC) and
the wealth constraint (WC) is binding, because s(a) is a lump-sum transfer that does not
distort incentives. Suppose that the PC is relaxed. If b(a) + s(a) > w, the principal can
increase payo⁄s by reducing a small amount of s(a). On the other hand, suppose the WC is
relaxed. If the PC is relaxed, the principal can be better o⁄ by reducing s(a) slightly so that
the manager is still willing to participate. Hence at least one of the PC or WC constraints
should bind at optimum.
A2. Lemma 2
Proof. Since the WC is relaxed, the PC has to bind by Lemma 1. The principal "sells the
store" to the manager at the price sFB(a) = 1￿feFB(a)￿(’a)+[1￿eFB(a)]￿(a)￿
(eFB(a))2
2k g;
where eFB(a) = k[￿(’a)￿￿(a)] is the ￿rst best e⁄ort. The condition for attaining this is that
WC is relaxed at the low state: ￿(a)+sFB(a) > w or a < a￿ where k
2[￿(’a￿)￿￿(a￿)]2 = 1￿w.
A3. Lemma 3
Proof. Since the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) is a concave function in e, we replace
it with the ￿rst order condition e = k[b(’a)￿b(a)] (IC
0
). Substitute this into the principal￿ s
objective to obtain her value function: Vf(a) = e[￿(’a)￿b(’a)]+(1￿e)[￿(a)￿b(a)]￿s(a),
30which is decreasing in b(a). Hence it is always optimal to set b(a) = 0: Then s(a) = w by the
binding WC.
Case 1: If the PC is binding, I denote all the solutions with a superscript BP. The net
payo⁄ accrued to the manager is V BP
m (a) = kb(’a)2 ￿ 1




k and eBP =
p
2k(1 ￿ w) under the restriction 1 ￿ 1
2k < w < 1.
Case 2: If PC is relaxed, I denote all the solutions with a superscript RP. Substituting
IC
0











f respectively for the three cases in which 1) the ￿rst best is achieved; 2) both the wealth
constraint and the participation constraint are binding; 3) the wealth constraint is binding,
but the participation constraint is relaxed. Substitute the optimal managerial e⁄orts and pay














￿￿(a)2 + ￿(a) ￿ w:






Case 1: a < a￿: Since a is so small that the ￿rst best e⁄ort is achievable. Obviously
V FB
f (a) > V RP
f (a) and V FB
f (a) ￿ V BP
f (a) = [
q
k
2￿￿(a) ￿ (1 ￿ w)]2 ￿ 0 with equality at a￿.
So the principal will choose the sell-the-store contract.
Case 2: a￿ ￿ a < a￿￿. Now the ￿rst best e⁄ort is not feasible. If the manager accepts
the equity-based pay, his net payo⁄ would be V RP
m (a) = k
8￿￿(a)2+ w, which is smaller
than his outside option when ￿(a) < ￿(a￿￿). Therefore both the wealth constraint and the
participation constraint are binding. The principal can only choose the ￿xed￿ bonus contract.
Case 3: a ￿ a￿￿. The wealth constraint is binding, and the participation constraint is
relaxed. V RP
f (a) ￿ V BP
f (a) = [
p
k
2 [￿(’a) ￿ ￿(a)] ￿
p
2(1 ￿ w)]2 ￿ 0 with equality at a￿￿.
Hence the principal will choose the equity-based contract.
A5. Proposition 2.
Proof. Rewrite the market clearing condition as
1 Z
a






[1 ￿ M(1 + F)]: (A1)

















































































































































































g(a)da decreases in a. Then the right hand side of (A1) increases in a.
Moreover, the di⁄erence between the left hand side and the right hand side is positive when
a ! 0; and the di⁄erence is negative when a ! 1. Therefore by the intermediate value
32theorem, the two sides intersect at a single interior point a 2 (0;1).
A6. Proposition 3.
Proof.
Part 1). I prove the ￿rst result in a general case without specifying the Pareto distribution

































































a)￿￿1g(a)da]. Rearranging terms and using the market entry condition: V Sell




k(’￿￿1￿1) = 1 + F, ￿(a;￿) can be written as:






















































Holding a constant, di⁄erentiate ￿(a;￿) with respect to ￿. It is straightforward to show
that ￿(a;￿) increases in ￿ if a￿ and a￿￿ are held as constant. The key is to check the

















































The e⁄ects through the threshold values cancel out. Hence
@￿(a;￿)
@￿ > 0. From the proof of
Proposition 2, we know
@￿(a;￿)








Part 2)-4). I prove the rest of the proposition under speci￿cation of the Pareto distribution



















d￿ < 0 and d￿￿￿
d￿ > 0:
The average CEO pay is given in (15). It is straightforward to show that df WCEO
d￿ > 0.
The skewness of the wage distribution of the CEOs is fully characterized by ￿
2(￿￿1), which
decreases in ￿. Hence an increase in ￿ increases the skewness of the distribution of CEO pay.
A7. Proposition 4
Proof.
Part 1). The ￿rst result holds for general talent distributions. The proof is similar to that
for Proposition 3, and is thus neglected. Under the speci￿cation of the Pareto distribution
of talent, it is easy to show that holding a constant, an increase in F pushes downwards the
left hand side of Equation (A1) but pushes upwards the right hand side. Therefore, the new
equilibrium shifts to the right, resulting in a larger a.
Part 2)-3). It is straightforward to show
d￿
dF < 0, d￿￿
dF > 0 and d￿￿￿
dF > 0 since
de




Part 4). For the last result, rewrite (16) as




￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ (1 ￿ w)
2(￿ ￿ 1)





























￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
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￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)















￿￿1￿2 < 1. Hence df WM
dF = df WM
de
de
dF > 0 as
de
dF > 0.
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